In the early morning hours of 26 February 1990, the first tentative signs of a new spirit of conciliation and comity emerged in Nicaragua. Prior to that moment, suspicion had dominated the country's political history. The government and its opposition each believed the worst about the other and repeatedly acted in ways that helped to confirm those beliefs and justify mutual distrust. Even when one side tried to be conciliatory, the other would dismiss it as a trick or a sign of weakness. The extremes on both sides always helped each other by exaggerating the negative and discounting the positive.
"Peaceful changes between different factions of the ruling classes, which have been rather frequent in other Latin American countries, have not taken place in Nicaragua," wrote Carlos Fonseca Amador, the founding father of the Sandinistas. "This traditional experienc e predisposed the Nicaraguan people against electoral farces and in favor of armed struggle.'" The government traditionally viewed the opposition as weak, fragmented, and ineffectual, and did everything it could to keep it that way. The opposition viewed the government as coercive and corrupt. When elections were called, some opposition groups would participate; others asked the people not to vote, lest they provide a veneer of legitimacy to a dictatorial regime.
Prior to 1990, only three Nicaraguan elections had been judged fair by some observers. The elections of 1928 and 1932 were viewed as fair, but since both were supervised by the U.S. Marines, they were not exactly ideal examples of self-determination. Many observers judged the 1984 election as fair, but a number of opposition groups, with encouragement from the Reagan administration, withdrew before the election, protesting government harassment. If the criterion for a free election is that the losers accept the results as fair, then Nicaragua had never had a free election--until 1990.
Opposition groups have long sought outside assistance from the regime's enemies. Thus, internal strife became inextricably tied to foreign intervention. Nicaraguans on one side would condemn the other for enlisting foreign help even while they were doing the same. This tragic pattern, so well analyzed by the father of the Sandinista party (FSLN), reached its logical conclusion under their rule. The FSLN accused its opposition of being ineffectual, disloyal pawns of the United States, while the opposition castigated the FSLN as a repressive MarxistLeninist surrogate of Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The Reagan administration helped each side's perceptions of the other come true. Its support for the contras justified the Sandinistas' militarism and deepened their dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, even while rendering the internal opposition impotent. The war further divided the country, killing thousands of its children and weakening an already fragile economy. Though the United States initially sought to reduce the polarization in Nicaragua, it soon found itself infected by the same disease. Extremism within Nicaragua and the United States and between the two governments evoked and justified extremism.
President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica offered both sides an opportunity to break loose from this tragic history. At Esquipulas, Guatemala in August 1987, he offered a proposal--accepted by Daniel Ortega and the other Central American presidents--to end conflicts in the region through democratization, national reconciliation, and a halt to support for insurgencies. By making each country responsible for securing democracy in all five, the plan cut the cord that had tied internal conflict to external intervention.
As part of the Esquipulas Accord, Arias and the other presidents asked the United States to stop funding the contras. Reagan called the plan "fatally flawed" and insisted that the Sandinistas would never accept democracy unless Congress approved military aid to the contras. The swing votes in Congress rejected Reagan's argument and accepted that of Arias, who told them that "it is time to focus on the positive .... Let us restore faith in dialogue and give peace a chance. ''2
Congressional approval of humanitarian but not military aid proved correct. Nicaraguans could not negotiate under the continuing pressure of the Reagan administration's approach; they needed some space, which Arias and Congress gave them. In March 1988, the Sandinistas and the contras sat down at the same table in a small Nicaraguan town called Sapoa and negotiated a ceasefire. This was an historic step forward, but the Administration's continued influence on the contras impeded any further progress. Central America had to wait for George Bush.
Ortega moved first. In conversations with Jimmy Carter and President Carlos Andr6s P6rez of Venezuela at the latter's inauguration on 1 February 1989, Ortega pledged to advance the date of his country's elections to 25 February 1990 as part of a package that included contra demobilization. This idea was then incorporated into an agreement at a Central American summit meeting in E1 Salvador on 14 February 1989. Nicaragua agreed to reform its electoral law, and Honduras pledged to help demobilize and repatriate the contras.
President Bush was also ready. Shortly after his election, he met with then-House Speaker Jim Wright, and the two agreed to resolve the divisive issue of contra aid. Secretary of State James A. Baker then negotiated a bipartisan accord with the Congressional leadership~ Announced on March 24, the accord declared support for Esquipulas, denied any military aid to the contras, and allowed humanitarian aid until the elections. The Bush administration's initiative allowed Nicaraguans to concentrate on elections and gave North Americans the time to think about other things.
The conditions for a free election were as good in 1990 as at any time in Nicaragua's history. President Ortega understood that the Nicaraguan economy was in desperate shape, and continued support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was uncertain. A free election promised to unlock aid from Western Europe, lift the U.S. embargo, and end the contra war definitively. Moreover, Ortega's private pollsters told him that he enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Nicaraguan people.
The opposition had learned two lessons from the 1984 election: unite and stay in the race. Invigorated by returning exiles like Alfredo C6sar, encouraged to participate by the Bush administration, and convinced that the collapse of the economy, the continued militarism of the Sandinistas, and the movement toward democracy in Latin America all played to its advantage, the opposition felt that it could win if there were a free election. In addition, Carlos Andr6s P6rez, Oscar Arias, and Spain's Prime Minister Felipe Gonz~ilez helped to keep the rules fair and the opposition united.
These newly favorable conditions and the spirit of compromise implicit in Esquipulas augured well for the electoral process, but they were countered by Nicaragua's historical burden of mutual suspicion and failed elections. The Nicaraguan government was committed in principle to a free election, but in practice this meant reducing Sandinista control over the state and the media and negotiating with the opposition on the terms that would give it confidence in electoral procedures. The Sandinista style was to hand down--the opposition would say "impose"--election rules, as with the April 1989 decree on the electoral reform law. When the Sandinistas refused to talk, the opposition fell back to its old stance of abstentionism. In July, when the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) chose 54 members for the regional electoral councils, the National Opposition Union (UNO) did not propose any candidates and abstained from voting because the FSLN would not negotiate.
On the eve of the next Central American summit, Ortega finally answered the opposition's call for a dialogue. In the resulting political accord of 4 August 1989, the government consented to a series of detailed rules that measurably increased the prospects for a free election. In exchange, the opposition agreed to call for demobilizing the contras. The Tela summit meeting in Honduras on August 7 reaffirmed these points and established a combined Organization of American States (OAS)-UN International Commission for Verification and Support (CIAV) for disarming and repatriating the contras.
The Campaign Begins
On September 2, the 14 disparate groups that had united to become UNO agreed on the candidacies of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro for president and Virgilio Godoy, the leader of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), for vice-president. Dofia Violeta was the widow of Pedro Joaqufn Chamorro, the life-long Somoza rival whose assassination in January 1978 was the catalyst that bonded Nicaragua's middle class to the Sandinistas and ensured their military victory in July 1979. She served on the first junta, but resigned in the spring of 1980 over the direction in which the Sandinistas were taking the country.
Mrs. Chamorro was a logical choice to be president because of her personal popularity, the symbolism and importance of the Chamorro family (four members had been president of Nicaragua), and most importantly, because she did not belong to any party. She proved to be a formidable candidate and organized a group of advisors led by Antonio Lacayo and Alfredo Crsar, two of Nicaragua's most astute political operators. Despite the heterogeneity of the UNO coalition, it was also able to agree on a platform and a single slate of candidates for the National Assembly and municipal elections.
At the top of the FSLN, Daniel Ortega, Sergio Ramfrez, and most other leaders were confident of victory and wanted to assure outside observers that they were committed to a fair election. The sentiments of their followers were more complicated and less democratic. FSLN campaign strategists fought a hard, negative campaign aimed at identifying UNO with both the contras and Somoza's National Guard. Typically, they also tried to divide UNO--for example, by encouraging the Social Christian Party to defect and assisting it to become a third force in the campaign. Sandinista militants saw conspiracies where others would see unrelated facts, and they resorted to harassment unless their leaders instructed them not to do so.
During the campaign, numerous complaints of serious violations were made, mostly by UNO. These included charges of land confiscation, conscription of UNO activists into the military, imbalance in the electoral councils, continued detention of political prisoners, limitations on media access, exclusion of Miskito Indian leaders, intimidation of UNO supporters seeking to register, padding of the registration rolls, intimidation of UNO candidates, harassment and violence at UNO campaign rallies, and impediments to receipt of external funding.
Most of these charges reflected legitimate concerns, but UNO rarely pursued them by documenting incidents and appealing to the Electoral Council. Instead, UNO intransigents preferred to use the charges to prove that the Sandinistas were not serious about a free election. The Sandinistas responded by accusing UNO of trying to discredit the election because they knew they would lose. The U.S. State Department echoed UNO, insisting that FSLN behavior "raises grave questions as to whether there can be truly free and fair elections in Nicaragua. ' '3 The Sandinistas also raised legitimate concerns about UNO's readiness to make complaints but unwillingness to document them and its constant denunciations of the SEC. The Nicaraguan government was primarily concerned, however, about the contras and U.S. policy. President Ortega said that he was willing to permit the U.S. to fund UNO overtly, but he would make the CIA a major campaign issue if there were any covert aid. The Bush administration decided against covert aid but would not assure the Sandinistas to this effect. In an effort to remove the issue of covert funding from the campaign, Carter asked Ortega if he would accept his promise that there would be no covert funding if Carter could get such assurances from the Bush administration and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. After discussions with both governments, Carter conveyed those assurances, and the question of covert funding (an important FSLN negative issue that in September had threatened to poison the campaign) virtually disappeared.
The Sandinistas asked Washington to accept the Central American Accords and channel U.S. funds through CIAV to demobilize the contras, whose attacks allegedly increased during the campaign. Though the contra issue often threatened to disrupt the electoral process, the Bush administration seemed to be paralyzed. It could not even get the contras to negotiate a new ceasefire arrangement with the Sandinistas in midNovember. The Bush administration dismissed virtually every opportunity to resolve the contra problem (even a proposal in December to demobilize the contras between the election and the inauguration), or to exchange ambassadors, expand diplomatic personnel, or pledge acceptance of the results if the three main observer groups found the elections free and fair. To its credit, though, the Administration was not a negative force in the election like its predecessor; it encouraged the opposition to participate, and it provided the space for others, including Carter, to play the role of opening the Nicaraguan political process.
The Role of the Observers
President Ortega invited the OAS and the UN to observe the elections in Nicaragua, but he realized that more would be needed to convince the U.S. that the elections were credible. In May 1989, Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford had observed the elections in Panama under the auspices of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, a group chaired by Carter and composed of 18 former and current heads of government from throughout the hemisphere. When Panamanian General Manuel Antonio Noriega refused to accept the election's results, Carter denounced him and urged the OAS to take action.
Carter sent me to Managua in July 1989 to meet with Ortega, Ram/rez, and leaders of the opposition and to describe how the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government had monitored the elections in Panama. The government was interested, and the opposition was enthusiastic about the idea of inviting Carter. In early August, both sides as well as the SEC invited Cater to observe the electoral process "from beginning to end." Ortega promised Carter "unrestricted access to all aspects of the process." Carter accepted, promising to be partial to the democratic process, but "meticulously impartial" with respect to competing candidates and parties.
In the end, the Nicaraguan election was observed by more international observers than any previous election in an independent country. On election day, there were 2,578 accredited foreign observers from 278 organizations and an additional 1,500 foreign correspondents. But the three main observer groups were Carter's, the OAS, and the UN. Each played a slightly different role. Both the OAS and the UN had the funds and the personnel to assemble large missions. The OAS, led by Mario Gonzalez, deployed its groups to every region, and its comparative advantage was in working out problems privately with the FSLN and UNO at the regional and national levels. The strength of the UN team, directed by Iqbal Riza, lay in its analytical skills and its diplomatic approaches at middle levels in Managua. UN reports of campaign problems were invaluable for all of the observers. Both the OAS and the UN had difficulty cooperating with each other, and Nicaraguans were often amused that the international observers seemed to be competing against each other as much as the candidates were.
Utilizing the information and analyses developed by the UN and OAS, and working in a coordinated way with OAS secretary general Joao Baena Soares and Elliot Richardson (the UN secretary general's special representative), Carter's high-level group tried to resolve the main problems by dealing directly with President Ortega and Mrs. Chamorro. The power of Carter's group stemmed partly from the prestige of a former U.S. president whose policies had initially been supportive of the Nicaraguan revolution and had always been respectful, and partly from a distinguished 35-person delegation that included Prime Minister George Price (Belize); 7 former presidents including Rafael Caldera (Venezuela), Ratil Alfonsln (Argentina), and Daniel Oduber (Costa Rica); and a bipartisan group of 12 from the U.S. Congress.
A number of lessons had been drawn from the Panamanian experience. First, the delegation needed to be well-prepared by having an on-site presence and making regular visits. Carter himself led three preelection trips to Nicaragua--accompanied by different Latin American presidents--and Caldera and Price led other trips. Each mission observed the process and resolved problems. Second, it was essential to retain the confidence and trust of all sides, but particularly of President Ortega, to ensure that if any problems emerged during the election or vote counting, Carter would have access and credibility. Third, the delegation had to make sure that the vote would be secret and to assure Nicaraguans of that fact. Fourth, and most important, a parallel "quick count" was essential to deter any tampering with the ballots and to provide confidence to all that the private decisions of the Nicaraguan people would be reflected in the final result.
Because Nicaragua was so polarized, there was no independent organization that could conduct a quick count like that which had been used to detect the fraud in Panama? Carter and the Council did not have sufficient personnel or resources, and the OAS was initially reluctant to undertake it. Carter first secured the approval for such a count from the SEC and the government and then persuaded Baena Soares and Richardson to cooperate with the Council to do a coordinated quick and comprehensive count.
Slow to organize the counts and unwilling to work together, the UN and the OAS eventually mounted separate operations that, by good fortune, complemented each other. The UN quick count, based on a sample of eight percent of the voters, provided compelling results by 10:00 P.M.--four hours after the polls closed--and this information was used to great effect. The main contribution of the OAS was its comprehensive count; it collected copies of the tally sheets from every voting site in the country. Had there been violence, a close vote, or any significant irregularity, this operation would have been essential to sort out who had actually won.
The international observers helped expand the boundaries of civility in a country filled with mistrust. The three groups would listen to UNO's charges, distill the hundreds of complaints down to the few that were most serious, and then take them up directly with the senior levels of the Sandinista government. In virtually every case, Ortega responded, though not as quickly or as fully as UNO wanted, and almost every issue was resolved.
President Ortega ended land confiscations; there was no further conscription into active military service; most of the political prisoners were released; the Supreme Electoral Council was painstakingly fair and virtually all of its decisions were made by consensus; opposition access to the media steadily improved; Brooklyn Rivera and other Indian leaders were permitted to return; 89 percent of Nicaraguans registered and UNO applauded the process; a decree on campaign violence eliminated this as a problem; after an initial wave of resignations, the intimidation of UNO candidates diminished and threats to poll-watchers during the election never materialized; UNO funding was released after an agreement mediated by Carter.
During the entire electoral campaign, the international observers were used as wedges prying open political space between the Sandinista party and the state, permitting UNO to bring its views to the Nicaraguan people, and giving the people a choice. Regrettably, hardly any of the problems were resolved by talks between Nicaraguans. When Carter raised the issue of campaign violence after a death at an UNO rally in Masatepe on December 10, the FSLN's first reaction was to handle it unilaterally, and UNO's was to walk out. Carter encouraged the SEC to call all the parties together to draft a specific set of regulations on campaign rallies. The Sandinistas then put forth a proposal that was provocative and unhelpful, and UNO walked out. The SEC then issued the decree without them. Carter and his group then renegotiated a more specific decree the next morning with Mrs. Chamorro and President Ortega, and the SEC issued it the next day. Though there were more than 300 subsequent campaign rallies, the United Nations reported that there were no more violent incidents, and UNO leaders attributed that fact to the decree.
In comparison to the electoral climate in Panama, where the press was shut down and opposition leaders were jailed and beaten, the Nicaraguan campaign was a democratic paradise. Yet the repressive atmosphere in Panama had not deterred a vast majority of Panamanians from voting against the government. The final lesson from Panama was to avoid getting diverted by minor issues and concentrate on assuring a secret vote, developing a rapport with the government, encouraging the opposition to participate, and constructing a parallel count to detect and thus discourage fraud.
The Election Unfolds
As the election approached, the Sandinistas were so confident that they tried to divert the international media to the issue of normalizing relations with the United States after their victory. Mrs. Chamorro's advisors were equally confident, but much more cautious. They did not even share their public-opinion surveys with other UNO leaders. As a result, many UNO hard-liners and most of their conservative supporters in the United States feared a Sandinista victory and tried to get the media to write off both the election and the international observers.
There were few incidents or problems on election day. UNO had poll-watchers at almost every voting site. One-and-a-half million people voted---86 percent of those who had registered. Nicaraguans were surprisingly somber, quiet, uncertain, perhaps afraid. Few volunteered their preferences; some would look around first and then sheepishly raise a single finger, signifying support for UNO. Confidence in the secrecy of the vote had been bolstered by appeals and assurances from Cardinal Obando y Bravo and Jimmy Carter, who gave a brief statement in Spanish urging Nicaraguans to vote "and be confident that your vote will be secret and will count. We are here to make sure of that .... We will monitor every step of the process and do parallel vote counts to guarantee that the final results reflect the will of the people."
The OAS fielded 435 observers, who visited 3,064 voting sites (70 percent of the total); the UN had 237 observers, who monitored 2,155 sites. Woody Allen once said that 90 percent of life is just being there, and that was the case for the international observers on election day. Just being there--actually almost everywhere--provided tranquility and confidence to the voters.
By 9:00 P.M., early returns suggested that Mrs. Chamorro was winning. This was the moment of decision, and Carter sought to locate President Ortega, but he was at a meeting of the FSLN Directorate. Carter then went to UN headquarters, where he was informed at 10:00 P.M. by Elliot Richardson and Iqbal Riza that slightly more than onethird of the UN sample had been received, and that Mrs. Chamorro was decisively ahead by a margin of about 56 percent to 40 percent. The margin was so great and the returns coming in were so consistent that there was no question about her victory. Richardson suggested that the two teams go to the National Vote Counting Center to brief the OAS secretary general and to see the SEC's results, and all agreed that Carter, in a private capacity, ought then to meet with Ortega.
The Counting Center was not announcing results, but at 11:30 P.M. President Ortega invited Carter, Richardson, and Baena Soares--the three "wise men"---to meet with him and other leading Sandinistas at FSLN campaign headquarters. This meeting with the three men and their senior aides began at 12:20 A.M. and ended 50 minutes later.
The Sandinistas appeared to be in shock. Ortega admitted that he was losing the election, though he was not yet prepared to abandon the possibility that the trend could reverse. Carter and Richardson made clear that their figures indicated that the margin was wider than Ortega's projections suggested, and that the numbers were stable and definitive.
Ortega reaffirmed that he would respect the popular will if UNO won, and he sought their advice on how the transition could be handled peacefully. The FSLN campaign headquarters was then rocking with the music of a band, and young Sandinistas were eager to celebrate their victory. It was clear that the Sandinistas would need time to prepare their people for defeat, and they were worried that a triumphalist response by UNO would provoke riots.
The three observers then met with Mrs. Chamorro at her home, and she agreed not to proclaim her victory until the SEC began to release returns, and then to make a conciliatory statement. Within an hour, by about 3:00 A.M., 30 percent of the returns were announced, indicating that Mrs. Chamorro was winning, and she made her statement. Three hours later, after 60 percent of the returns were released, Ortega appeared on television; his face announced that he had lost, and he stated that he would respect the results. The next afternoon, he asked the three wise men to accompany him to Mrs. Chamorro's home, where he congratulated her and agreed to work with her to keep the transition smooth and give democracy a chance.
The final results showed Mrs. Chamorro winning 54.7 percent and Daniel Ortega, 40.8 percent. Of the other eight parties, only Moisrs Hassan of the Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) won more than one percent of the vote and qualified for a seat in the National Assembly. Of the remaining 91 seats, UNO had 51; the FSLN, 39; and Yatama (Atlantic Coast), 1. (To amend the Constitution, UNO would need FSLN support, and that is salutary since it will encourage UNO to be conciliatory.) UNO also won 102 of 131 municipalities. Though some Americans feared that Sandinista control of the government tilted the "playing field" in their favor, the burden of incumbency--of having governed during ten years of war and economic deterioration--proved much more significant.
The Transfer of Power
The indirect exchange between Ortega and Mrs. Chamorro in the early morning hours of February 26 was the first time in Nicaraguan history that the government and the opposition sought ways to reassure each other and the nation. Both sides soon agreed on virtually every step that each would take during the next week, and this orchestrated process served to build confidence where none had existed before.
Both Ortega and Chamorro asked the three observers to remain to monitor and guarantee the transition. Both sides appointed practical and mature leaders to head their transition teams---Humberto Ortega for the Sandinistas and Antonio Lacayo for UNO. Each knew the other as a moderate, and both were determined to work together in a manner that prevented the extremists in both parties from capturing the initiative or destabilizing the transition. Over the next two days, Carter met with each transition team several times; on the afternoon of February 27, he invited both teams to the Carter Center's Managua office.
The two teams discovered that their differences were not as wide as the extremists portrayed. Within two hours, they defined parameters for the transition that subsequently withstood the criticisms of their militants. Both sides agreed that Mrs. Chamorro would assume full power on April 25 and would name all her ministers. Second, they agreed that for the transition and the Chamorro government to succeed, there could be no retribution, and each side would need to be sensitive to the main concerns of the other. Chamorro would respect "the integrity of the armed forces as an institution" and appoint ministers of defense and interior who would not be viewed as enemies by the Sandinistas.
Third, both sides agreed to call for the rapid and immediate demobilization of the contras and to work toward that end as a way to ensure stability. As that was accomplished, it would become easier to implement Mrs. Chamorro's campaign promise to reduce the size of the army. UNO confirmed its commitment to maintain land reform, and both sides agreed to deal with the problems of expropriated property within the law. One month later, on March 27, the two sides published this understanding as a "protocol of transition."
In a press conference reported in La Prensa on April 5, Antonio Lacayo said that the aim of the new Chamorro government will be "to break the violent cycle" of Nicaragua's past. To do so, UNO would have "to respect the 41-percent minority"--the Sandinistas. He was criticized by members of his own coalition for being too solicitous of the FSLN, but he insisted that the only way for democracy to take root was through national reconciliation. This was to be a key theme of Mrs. Chamorro's inaugural address.
A remarkable event occurred in Nicaragua on February 25. A strategy based on trust and respect prevailed, and for the first time in Nicaraguan history, the skeptics and the extremists found themselves on the margins of events. Those, like President Ronald Reagan, who had said that the Sandinistas were communists who would never allow a free election, were proven wrong. Those who had said that the Sandinistas would never accept the results and transfer power were also proven wrong. These predictions, however, were not outlandish. Indeed, if Reagan had still been president and had discouraged the opposition from participating in the election, as his administration had done in 1984, his prediction would have remained true.
No doubt, Ortega's confidence of victory was one of the reasons why the process worked, but the campaign itself transformed both parties and Nicaragua's politics. Ortega began to respond to the public temper, and the public responded to him too. Winning 41 percent of the vote was a sign of that. For the first time, outsiders were invited and welcomed by both sides, and they played a pivotal role in helping both government and opposition accept a peaceful process of political change. Both sides had staked so much on the judgment of these outsiders that by election day, it was very difficult to break that trust. Daniel Ortega had the option of stealing the election, and if he were as cynical as the Reagan administration had alleged, he would have done that. But he was not, and he did not. In a country where distrust was the currency of politics, both government and opposition decided to break loose from that history and peacefully accept a change in their roles.
The inauguration of Violeta de Chamorro on April 25 was not the end of the transition but just the completion of its first phase. The tenacity of Nicaragua's polarization was illustrated at the inaugural ceremony in a stadium divided between UNO and FSLN supporters; almost every time one side applauded, the other side hissed. "A consolidated democracy," Laurence Whitehead writes, "is one in which rival forces have a shared sense of authorship and make a common investment in the future. This sense can only be implanted through negotiations between antagonists.
[and it] typically requires an iterative process of confidence-building. ''6 The period of confidence-building began the morning after the election, but it will take years and the resolution of many crises before democracy will take root in Nicaragua. In the meantime, both the Chamorro government and the Ortega brothers will have to contend with the intransigent wings of their respective coalitions, even as they maneuver for advantage against each other.
Analytically, it is useful to think of both camps as having their conciliatory and confrontational factions. During the transition, the conciliatory factions were ascendant and mutually reinforcing. But the situation was always precarious because neither side could afford to ignore its most militant supporters. With each conciliatory gesture toward the Sandinistas, Chamorro antagonized UNO's hard-liners. Daniel Ortega's job was equally tough: to reassure his militants while conceding power to those he had recently accused of being unpatriotic.
The most dangerous issue during the transition was the demobilization of the contras. If an agreement had been reached to disarm them by inauguration day, as the Sandinistas originally had proposed, Humberto Ortega would have retired. But the negotiations dragged on and Mrs. Chamorro, finding herself between two hostile armies of unequal strength, was compelled to rely on the Sandinistas and test their loyalty. She judged that Humberto Ortega would pass the test more effectively than anyone else. In her inaugural address, she said that he would stay on as chief of the army to oversee the demobilization of the contras, retrieve the weapons distributed to Sandinista supporters, and prepare a plan for significant reductions of the armed forces.
She paid a high price for that decision. One week before the inauguration, the contras agreed to begin disarmament soon and complete it by June 10, but after her announcement, contra leaders hinted that they would no longer comply. The appointment of Humberto Ortega also catalyzed an alliance of intransigent elements at both ends of UNO's ideological spectrum. This group is inclined to treat the Sandinistas as contemptuously as the Sandinistas treated them. They repeat the patterns of the past, and Sandinista hard-liners continue to play into their hands, making reconciliation more difficult. The outgoing Sandinista-dominated Assembly passed partisan laws on property, amnesty, and the civil service, provoking UNO to change them when it took power. The rampant theft of state property by the Sandinistas also forced UNO to respond in a manner that escalated tensions.
Keeping UNO united while working with the Sandinistas will be a difficult, perhaps impossible task. UNO's conciliatory faction in the Assembly, led by Alfredo C6sar, may well be a pivot, sometimes leading a united UNO and imposing laws on the FSLN, and at other times voting with the FSLN and being condemned as "traitors" by UNO hardliners.
The subordination of the military to the new regime is a long-term issue made more difficult by the problem of integrating the contras into the new community. The economy is in disastrous shape, and it will take time, money, and cooperation both within Nicaragua and with the United States and other donors to get it moving forward. These problems cannot be solved by a stroke of the pen; they will require hundreds of decisions over many years while confidence slowly builds. It will be a long journey, made more difficult by the accumulated burdens of history, but Nicaraguans are finally on the right road.
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